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Abstract 
 
Even though Daniel Ellsberg’s 1961 article “Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms” is well-known 
and increasingly quoted in current decision theory, introducing the counterexample to Bayesian 
decision-making that got the normative value of Savage’s theory into trouble, its philosophical 
background remains totally unknown. This paper examines Ellsberg’s motivations in presenting his 
critique first to his fellow decision theorists at Harvard and RAND in the late 1950s and it goes into 
his reasons for giving a philosophical justification and defence of the paradox in his doctoral thesis 
of 1962. By concentrating mainly on Ellsberg’s all-encompassing analysis of decision-making in his 
thesis, the paper shows that a number of relevant issues connected to the paradox can be thrown 
light on. These range from its historical background to the way to test the normative value of 
decision theory through experiments, and a taxonomy of decision rules based on alternative 
probabilistic set-ups. Crucially, the paper argues that Ellsberg subscribed to a generalised version of 
the Bayesian approach, one that informs the developments of the multiple prior approach in current 
decision theory, but finds its origins in Keynes’s Treatise on Probability. 
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“So, what’s the paradox?” Convincing them [the laymen] that 
they do not always act as if they assigned precise numerical 
probabilities to uncertain events needs no demonstration for 
nearly anyone (other than ordained Bayesian statisticians). 
 
Ellsberg (2011, p. 221) 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Daniel Ellsberg is a truly unconventional figure. In 2011, at the age of 80, he was interviewed in 
major American television networks and newspapers as a supporter of Julian Assange’s release of 
classified US documents through the website Wikileaks. Ellsberg’s involvement was motivated by 
the fact that he was the man who forty years earlier had released to the press several classified 
documents – came to be known as the “Pentagon Papers” – that showed that the Johnson 
Administration had systematically lied to the US Congress about a subject of “transcendent national 
interest and significance” such as the actual achievements on the field of the Vietnam War (Apple 
1996).1 
 
 The 1971 episode explains why the career of the former US Marine and military analyst and 
consultant at the RAND Corporation and the US Defence Department, who also served two years in 
Vietnam during the war, was put to an end. But this episode may also explain why Ellsberg did not 
pursue an academic career. A Harvard economics graduate, Ellsberg published two papers on utility 
and game theory in the mid-1950s. After serving in the Army for three years, he resumed graduate 
studies at Harvard in 1957, and he published a few more articles in economic journals, including the 
famous 1961  Quarterly Journal of Economics essay on ambiguity in decision-making. He 
completed his Ph.D. at Harvard in 1962, while already involved with RAND. But his decision to 
serve as military consultant made him unable to keep contributing to economics. As a result, the 
paradox of choice now known as the Ellsberg Paradox – a result that threw decision theory in deep 
disarray, and yet remained unaddressed for long, “simply because researchers at the time were 
helpless to address [it]” (Machina 2001, p. xxxix) – was presented in the early 1960s without the 
economic theorist behind it becoming involved in its defence and development. Even today, with 
hundreds of articles in major economic journals referring to the Ellsberg Paradox each year, and 
leading decision theorists still in the process of working out the nature and implications of 
ambiguity aversion, the overwhelming majority of economists think of Ellsberg only as a paradox 
and not as a fellow-economist.2  
 
 If we do look at Ellsberg as an economist, we discover another important unorthodox aspect. 
Even though his 1961 article “Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms” is well-known and 
                                                 
1 Even very recently his support for Edward Snowden and his role in sparkling the debate that forced US 
Congress to change surveillance law has been given attention in the international press (MacAskill et al. 
2015). 
2 Almost all current studies on decision-making under uncertainty originate as attempts to account for 
Ellsberg’s ambiguity, particularly after the experimental evidence confirming his results became 
overwhelming  (Camerer and Weber 1992). Even the recent interest in multiple-prior models and non-
additive probability measures was initially brought about by the observation that decision-makers usually 
exhibit an aversion towards the  ambiguous situations pointed out by Ellsberg (Wakker 2008; Gilboa 
2009). 
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increasingly quoted, its philosophical background remains totally unknown.3 In addition, very few 
attempts to  devise a decision rule that can solve the paradox refer to Ellsberg’s own ideas about a 
possible solution. This is not very surprising: Ellsberg’s 1961 QJE article is rather sketchy on both 
aspects. In his Ph.D. thesis, however, he dealt with both aspects in detail. Up until the recent 
printing of the thesis (Ellsberg 2001), conventional wisdom, even among historians of recent 
economics, seems to have been that the article was an excerpt of the thesis, while in fact the thesis 
was finished after the article had been published.4 
 
 The main aim of this paper is to put the Ellsberg Paradox in the right context. This paper 
examines Ellsberg’s motivations in presenting it first to his fellow decision theorists at Harvard and 
RAND in the late 1950s and then to the economics profession in 1961. It also goes into his reasons 
for giving a methodological justification and defence in his doctoral thesis of 1962. By 
concentrating mainly on Ellsberg’s deep and all-encompassing analysis of decision-making in his 
thesis, the paper shows that a number of relevant issues connected to the paradox can be thrown 
light on. More in particular, the paper argues that Ellsberg subscribed to a generalised version of the 
Bayesian approach, one that informs the developments of the multiple prior approach in current 
decision theory. The paper aims to show that even more than 50 years after the publication of the 
Ellsberg Paradox, an assessment of Ellsberg as decision theorist is necessary and important. 
 
 
2. Ellsberg’s early years 
 
Ellsberg was born in Chicago in 1931 and attended Harvard University on a scholarship. He 
graduated in economics under the supervision of John Chipman in 1952, with a thesis titled 
“Theories of Rational Choice under Uncertainty: The Contribution of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern.” He then spent a year as a visiting scholar at the University of Cambridge, UK, where 
he worked on a revision of part of his thesis, later published as Ellsberg (1954 and 1956). On his 
return to the US he entered the Marine Corps Basic School and served as a platoon leader, leaving 
the Corps in 1957 as a First Lieutenant. 
 
 Ellsberg started graduate school at Harvard University in 1957. As a Junior Fellow of the 
Society of Fellows at Harvard he started working on his critique of the Savage axioms. His graduate 
studies were interrupted when he joined the RAND Corporation as a strategic analyst in 1959. He 
also served as a consultant to the Defence Department, where he specialized in problems of the 
command and control of nuclear weapons, nuclear war plans, and crisis decision-making. He 
completed his Ph.D. in Economics at Harvard in 1962, with a thesis entitled Risk, Ambiguity and 
Decision, which partly drew on the 1961 essay “Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms.” In 1964 
Ellsberg joined the Defence Department as Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary of Defence (for 
International Security Affairs) John McNaughton, where he worked on the escalation of the war in 
Vietnam. He transferred to the State Department in 1965 and served for two years at the US 
Embassy in Saigon, where he was involved in the evaluation of pacification initiatives in the field. 
On his return to the RAND Corporation in 1967, Ellsberg worked on the top secret McNamara 
study about US decision-making in Vietnam (1945-68). In 1969, convinced that the McNamara 
study revealed that the US Administration had expanded their military operations without approval 
from Congress and had misled the public about the real intentions they pursued during the war, 
                                                 
3 A search for articles citing Ellsberg’s 1961 paper in the single year 2014 using Google Scholar returns 
515 quotations (search made on Sept 1, 2015). 
4 As recalled by Ellsberg himself (2011, p. 225), “most of those who have become aware that the thesis 
existed, either before or after it was published, have had the mistaken belief that it was written before the 
1961 QJE article, which, they suppose, represents a concise summary of the thesis.” 
4 
Ellsberg made photocopies of the 7,000 page study and gave it to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. After he had been unable to persuade the Senators he had contacted to make it public, 
he sent it to the New York Times, the Washington Post and 17 other newspapers. This was in 1971. 
After the publication of these “Pentagon Papers,” Ellsberg publicly turned himself in to the US 
Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts in Boston, well aware that he was facing charges 
of conspiracy under the Espionage Act of 1917, which carried a total maximum sentence of 115 
years. Luckily, during the hearings of the trial Ellsberg’s defence was able to prove gross 
governmental misconduct and illegal evidence gathering, and the judge officiating the case 
dismissed all charges in 1973. Ellsberg then became a political activist and writer.5 
 
 Ellsberg started publishing in major economic journals soon after his graduation from 
Harvard in 1952. These publications are extensively quoted in a variety of different fields. In his 
first article, an elaboration of the bachelor’s thesis, Ellsberg (1954) compares von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s notion of utility to the classical notion of a cardinal utility function and clarifies the 
nature of the cardinality used in expected utility theory. The article, written while he still supported 
a mainstream view of decision-making, is praised in the literature for its clarity in explaining the 
different derivation and significance of the two notions of cardinal utility (Fishburn 1989; Giocoli 
2003). In his second paper, which was also taken from his thesis, Ellsberg (1956) is critical of the 
notion of minimax strategy equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games. The motivations justifying 
the choice of a “reluctant duellist” not to follow the prescription of the theory, as she doubts her 
adversary really to play a maximin strategy, are part of “a small literature (beginning with Ellsberg 
1956) and a much larger oral tradition which argues that Nash behaviour is neither a necessary 
consequence of rationality nor a reasonable empirical proposition” (Bernheim 1984, p. 1007). It is 
worth noting that Ellsberg presents his argument emphasising that these “particular uncertainties – 
as to the other players’ beliefs about oneself – are almost universal” (Ellsberg 1956, p. 43). 
 
 Ellsberg’s openness to game theoretical insights, combined with his refusal to apply 
equilibrium notions in an uncritical manner, is confirmed by his third 1950s essay, a RAND 
research paper on the theory and practice of blackmail (Ellsberg 1959) that is quoted extensively in 
political science literature (Zagare 2004). This is the most remarkable of a series of studies on 
conflict and bargaining, including an analysis of the “deterrence policy” a superpower can enforce 
avoiding to make “attack” a dominant strategy for the opponent, in the same vein of Schelling 
(1960) (Ellsberg 1961b). The motivation for distancing his analysis from a more conventional 
game-theoretical one appears to be the attention Ellsberg pays to the informational conundrum that 
decision-makers are plunged into when acting in a real strategic context – a state of affairs he had 
experienced personally as a consultant to the US government.6 As a matter of fact, the issue of how 
to represent the state of information of a decision-maker acting under uncertainty already became 
the major focus of his analysis in the late 1950s. In his office at RAND, by means of “endless trial 
and error with paper and pen,” Ellsberg (2011, p. 223) recalls, he was 
 
“searching for choices between gambles – actions with uncertain outcomes – that would 
give operational meaning behaviorally for the first time to Frank Knight’s distinction 
between ‘risk’ – roulette-like gambles with ‘known,’ precise probabilities – and 
‘uncertainty,’ when no such probabilities were ‘known.’”.7 
                                                 
5 See Ellsberg (2003; 2006). On the controversial aspects of Ellsberg’s life see Samuels (2002).  
6 The quality of his involvement in actual decision-making is exemplified, for instance, by taking part in 
two of the three working groups reporting to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council  
during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 (Ellsberg 2006). 
7 Ellsberg’s (1958) review of Davidson et al (1957) is the first publication in which the paradox is alluded 
to. Ellsberg (1958, pp. 1010-1011) prizes the methodology presented in the riviewed volume, one of the 
5 
3. Introducing the Ellsberg Paradox 
 
In order to highlight the significance of Ellsberg’s analysis of decision-making put forward in his 
1962 doctoral thesis, this section provides a brief summary of how the paradox of choice was 
introduced in the original QJE article. Ellsberg’s 1961 essay, first presented at the December 
Meeting of the Econometric Society in St. Louis in 1960, was published as part of a symposium on 
“Decision under Uncertainty” that also included a paper by William Fellner on subjective 
probability distortions and a critical comment by Howard Raiffa. Two further comments on the 
articles of the symposium were published in 1963, the first by Brewer (1963), who addressed 
mostly Fellner’s paper, and the second by Roberts (1963), who reacted to Ellsberg’s. Both Ellsberg 
(1963) and Fellner (1963) briefly replied to their critics.8 Brewer and Fellner (1965) summarised 
the debate. This also led to the first paper that set forth an experiment demonstrating the relevance 
of the violations Ellsberg had described (Becker and Brownson 1964). The outcome of this brief 
round of discussion, it should be reminded, was in line with Raiffa’s main point: violations simply 
showed that people needed to be thought about the theory. As a matter of fact, abandoning Savage’s 
axioms would meant depriving decision theory of its foundation elements, and no alternative could 
be envisaged yet. As a result, interest in the topic mainly faded away at least until Einhorn and 
Hogarth (1986) proposed a descriptive model of judgement under uncertainty accounting for 
ambiguity in the same vein of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and the available experimental 
evidence became overwhelming (Camerer and Weber 1992). 
 
 Ellsberg opens his 1961 article with a reference to Knight’s distinction between measurable 
and unmeasurable uncertainty. He observes that contemporary developments of subjective expected 
utility theory motivated a growing scepticism about the behavioural significance of this distinction.9 
Ellsberg acknowledges that Leonard Savage’s Foundations of Statistics provides the axiomatic 
structure to substantiate the point that, in the subjectivist interpretation of probability theory, risk 
and uncertainty become indistinguishable since actual decisions are interpreted as revealing degrees 
of belief, even when no statistical frequencies of events relevant to the decision are available. 
Indeed, Savage (1954) showed that one can deduce a unique subjective probability distribution over 
events with unknown probabilities from a decision-maker’s choice behaviour, provided the 
behaviour satisfies certain axioms. But Ellsberg argues nonetheless that one cannot deny that there 
are probability relations about which decision-makers feel less “sure” as compared to others. 
Moreover, this holds true not only in complex situations like investment decisions or war gaming, 
but even when examining how decision-makers act in simple urn problems. 
 
 In a first example with two urns, Ellsberg argues that many decision-makers refrain from 
                                                                                                                                                                  
first works intended to test experimentally the significance of the Bayesian approach under uncertainty, 
but he objects to the nature of the axioms the authors have chosen to test. The authors are criticized 
because “they tend to suggest that their basic hypothesis is uniquely plausible, covering reasonable 
behaviour on all occasions of uncertainty”, while “there are important classes of uncertain situations in 
which normal people will systematically violate these axioms, and in which other hypotheses will better 
describe their behavior.” 
8 Ellsberg’s reply is his single published comment on the debate opened by the 1961 article. 
9 In his highly influential review article on alternative theories of decision-making in “risk-taking 
situations,” Arrow (1951) had already promoted a new Bayesian consensus on the basis of Savage’s early 
draft of his Foundations of Statistics. After assessing Knight’s contribution from a subjectivist viewpoint, 
Arrow (1951, p. 417) commented: “Knight’s uncertainties seem to have surprisingly many of the 
properties of ordinary probabilities, and it is not clear how much is gained by the distinction.” See also 
Marschak (1950).  
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betting on the drawing of balls from an uncertain urn when a risky one is available.10 In a second 
example with a single urn whose composition is partly known and partly unknown, many decision-
makers refrain from betting on the drawing of balls constituting the unknown part of the urn.11 In 
both cases the choice behaviour of most decision-makers fails to conform to the prescriptions of  
subjective expected utility theory. Crucially, Ellsberg reports that a considerable number of subjects 
did not change their choices even after thorough reconsideration of the significance of the theory, 
thus showing to be “unrepentant violators” of the Savage axioms. Ellsberg did not run experimental 
sessions and he presents his urn examples mainly as “hypothetical experiments.” He also illustrated 
his examples at faculty seminars he gave in the late 1950s: people tested during these seminars were 
mostly faculty members at the Universities of Chicago, Harvard, Northwestern and Yale, and at the 
RAND Corporation. 
 
 Aiming to avoid for his examples to be classified as a descriptive anomaly of an otherwise 
acceptable normative theory, Ellsberg (1961a, p. 646) concentrates on “deliberate decisions,” that is, 
“choices that people make when they take plenty of time to reflect over their decision, in the light of 
the [Savage] postulates.” This is an acknowledgement that, in principle, he accepts Savage’s 
reaction to Allais’s (1953) counter-example: decision theory has a normative status that cannot be 
criticised on the grounds of descriptive failures per se, since a decision-maker who instinctively 
violates the theory when confronting Allais’s decision set-up is supposed to reverse her choice after 
“thorough deliberation” (Savage 1954, p. 102). It is only “deliberate decisions” that are apt to reveal 
degrees of belief compatible with a probability measure, that is, that must show consistency with 
the axioms of the theory.12 
 
 Ellsberg concludes that, since the group of many “otherwise reasonable people” he tested 
who did not conform to the Savage axioms included a number of fellow decision theorists, his 
examples cannot be simply suggesting descriptive violations; they show that the normative content 
of the theory is not as compelling as generally agreed. In other words, urn examples are offered in 
order to show that the choices of “a number of people who are not only sophisticated but 
                                                 
10 As is well-known, Ellsberg’s first example concerns the choice of betting on the drawn of a red (or black) 
ball from either an urn containing 100 red and black balls in an unknown proportion, or an urn containing 
50 red and 50 black balls. Individuals tested by Ellsberg tended to be indifferent between betting on red or 
black when confronting each urn separately. But when asked to choose from which urn they would prefer 
to bet that a red (or a black) ball would be drawn, most respondents revealed to Ellsberg a preference for 
the second, “unambiguous” urn, with respect to the first, “ambiguous” one. These choices, Ellsberg 
observed, are contradictory with a definite, sharp probability assignment. Indeed, the indifference of 
decision-makers between betting on the red or blue drawn from urn I or II examined separately means 
that their subjective probabilities p are such that p(redI)=p(blackI)=1/2 and p(redII)=p(blackII)=1/2. 
However when they choose to bet on red (or black) from  the second urn they reveal p(redII)>p(redI) (or 
p(blackII)>p(blackI)). Following on Ellsberg, the non-additive probability approach of Schmeidler (1989) 
proposes an axiomatic system for subjective probabilities such that  p(redI)+p(blackI)<p(redI∪blackI). The 
individual who prefers to bet on urn II is said to show ambiguity aversion in current decision theory. 
11 Ellsberg’s second example yields a direct test of Savage’s “sure-thing principle,” Savage’s substitute for  
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s indipendence principle outside risky lotteries. 
12 This was the conventional reaction of the “American School” when challenged by the Allais Paradox in 
the early 1950s (Jallais and Pradier 2005). When he was presented Allais’s example at an informal 
meeting during the 1952 International Colloquium on Risk in Paris, Savage expressed preferences 
contradicting his axioms. Upon reflection, though, he changed his mind and claimed: “it seems to me that 
in reversing my preference … I have corrected an error” (Savage 1954, p. 103). See also Morgenstern 
(1979). It should be noted that at least until MacCrimmon (1968) and Slovic and Tversky (1974) the 
influence of Allais’s paradox on normative decision theory was almost nihil. The paradox was considered 
for long time only an isolated example suggesting a descriptive anomaly.  
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reasonable” do not conform to a numerical probability, even upon reflection. Savage is reported by 
Ellsberg (1961a, p. 656) to be one of them.13 The attack on the consolidating mainstream 
represented by subjective expected utility theory is explicitly put as follows (Ellsberg 1961a, p. 
646): 
“I propose to indicate a class of choice-situations in which many otherwise reasonable 
people neither wish nor tend to conform to the Savage postulates, nor to the other axiom sets 
that have been devised”. 
 
These choice-situations, he claims, must involve “uncertainties that are not risks.” 
 
 Ellsberg is well aware that the notion of uncertainty hinted at by Knight cannot be restricted 
to simplified cases like the one he discusses, and that there is no “true” uncertainty in his 
“unknown” urn. In his brief comments on the significance of his results beyond simple decisional 
contexts he hints at a “broader field of application” and suggests that, as compared with the effects 
of “familiar” production decisions or decisions concerning random processes (like coin flipping or 
urn extractions), “the results of Research and Development, or the performance of a new President, 
or the tactics of an unfamiliar opponent are all likely to appear ambiguous” (Ellsberg 1961a, p. 
661). But in order to avoid being caught in a methodological discussion about the meaning of 
uncertainty, he claims to concentrate on discussing a “third dimension” of the problem of choice, 
additional to utility and probability proper, one which concerns the nature of the decision-maker’s 
information. What is at issue in his decision problem, Ellsberg (1961a, p. 657) claims, is what 
 
“might be called the ambiguity of this information, a quality depending on the amount, type, 
reliability and ‘unanimity’ of information, and giving rise to one’s degree of ‘confidence’ in 
an estimate of relative likelihoods.” 
 
Ambiguity is a qualitative notion as it may be high (and the confidence in any particular estimate of 
probabilities low) even where there is ample quantity of information, but “there are questions of 
reliability and relevance of information, and particularly where there is conflicting opinion and 
evidence” (Ellsberg 1961a, p. 659).14 To be sure, Ellsberg concludes, Savage himself alluded to a 
difficulty in his approach when arguing that “there seems to be some probability relations among 
which we feel relatively more ‘sure’ as compared to others,” and that “vagueness associated with 
judgements of the magnitude of personal probability” may constitute a difficulty for the theory of 
                                                 
13 Ellsberg’s (2001, p. xlix) recollection is that he showed his examples to Savage in February 1958, when 
Savage reacted “encouraging me to believe that the arguments presented here deserved serious 
consideration.” Ellsberg discussed the topic with Savage while writing the thesis, but there is no evidence 
that the comments concerning a draft of the thesis promised by Savage to Ellsberg in a letter dated 
February 8, 1962 – in the hope they arrive “soon enough to affect your thesis, insofar you find them 
pertinent” – have ever been written. The manuscript of Ellsberg’s thesis, sent to Savage a few days before 
its defence, is announced as “a 400-page letter to you, designed to change your mind” (Letter from D. 
Ellsberg to L. J. Savage, May 21, 1962, Leonard J. Savage Papers, MS 695, Box 11/260, Manuscript and 
Archives, Yale University). Ellsberg did not collect personal correspondence he had during his 
“economics” years (personal communication). 
14 In the economics literature the term ambiguity has been used in different ways, either as second order 
uncertainty, or “uncertainty about uncertainties” (Einhorn and Hogarth 1986, p. 227), or “uncertainty 
about probability, created by missing information that is relevant and could be known” (Camerer and 
Weber 1992, p. 330). The widespread attitude in current decision theory is to use uncertainty as a generic 
term to describe all states of information about probabilities. While risk is used when the relevant 
probabilities are known, ambiguity refers to situations where some or all of the relevant information about 
probabilities is missing. Choices are said to be ambiguous if they are influenced by events whose 
probabilities are unknown or difficult to determine (Eichberger and Kelsey 2009).  
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personal probability (Savage 1954, p. 57, 59). But it is only Knight who stated that this is a crucial 
aspect of decision-making.15 Clearly, Ellsberg’s contention about the degree of confidence in a 
probability assessment resembles Keynes’s approach to uncertainty at least as much as Knight’s. 
But neither the General Theory nor the Treatise on Probability are mentioned in his paper.16 
 
 A series of technical aspects that are discussed in the 1961 paper deserve mention as they 
constitute the subject matter of many later developments in decision theory. First, Ellsberg justifies 
the search of decision criteria alternative to the maximisation of expected utilities on the grounds 
that the probabilities that can be elicited from the choices of the decision-makers who prefer to bet 
on the “known” urn are “inconsistent with the essential properties of probability relationships” 
(Ellsberg 1961a, p. 651). There is no examination, though, of what the relaxing of some of these 
properties may imply in terms of an alternative representation. Second, the epistemic state of a 
decision-maker whose choices cannot be represented by a probability distribution is interpreted as 
that of a decision-maker who cannot commit herself to a single probability distribution out of a set 
of possible probability priors. Ellsberg proposes to interpret the beliefs of the violator of the Savage 
axioms as those of a decision-maker who, out of the set of all possible probability distributions, 
takes into account a subset of distributions “that still seem ‘reasonable,’ reflecting judgements that 
he ‘might almost as well’ have made, or that his information – perceived as scanty, unreliable, 
ambiguous – does not permit him confidently to rule out” (Ellsberg 1961a, p. 661). The subjective 
probability distribution presupposed by a Bayesian theorist is now considered simply a best 
estimate among the set of “reasonable” probability distributions. Third, a parameter representing the 
decision-maker’s confidence in her best estimate is introduced in order to specify a decision rule 
alternative to the maximisation of subjective expected utility. Inspired by statistical literature 
(Hodges and Lehmann 1952), Ellsberg suggests a decision rule that is a mixture of “best guess” and 
“maximin”: the decision-maker should choose the action x associated with the highest value of the 
index ρE(x)+(1-ρ)min(x), where E(x), the expected utility of action x with respect to the best 
probability estimate, is weighted with respect to the degree of confidence, ρ, encapsulating the 
influence of the ambiguity surrounding the decision process. If no ambiguity is perceived (i.e., ρ=1) 
the uncertain context can be reduced to a risky one, so the rule coincides with Savage’s. The case of 
“complete” ignorance (i.e., ρ=0) suggests concentrating on maximising the minimum possible 
outcome associated with the action as in Wald (1945). In between these two extremes the more 
relevant case of “considerable” ignorance is contemplated, and the existence of ambiguity (i.e., 
0<ρ<1) implies that the best guess distribution is now weighted with the maximin. Ellsberg 
concludes the presentation of his decision rule with a numerical example that accounts for the 
                                                 
15 There is no reference to Ellsberg in Savage’s printed works apart from Savage’s annotated bibliography 
prepared for the 2nd edition of the Foundations of Statistics, in which the papers presented at the 1961 
QJE Symposium are said to present “an account of an important line of dissent from the theory of 
personal probability and utility” (Savage 1970, p. 25). Savage (1970, p. 24) also acknowledges that de 
Finetti and Savage (1962) “discuss a large number of doubts and difficulties about the actual application 
of personal probability,” but while the notion of interval-valued probabilities is examined at length, there 
is no mention of Ellsberg in that paper. De Finetti’s (1967) taxonomy of the varieties of subjective 
approaches to probability, which draws on de Finetti and Savage (1962), classifies Ellsberg’s analysis 
among subjective “psychological” theories, devoid of normative content. On de Finetti’s analysis of 
interval probabilities see Feduzi et al. (2014). 
16 Knight’s (1921, p. 233) reference to confidence is peripheral but unequivocal: “The business man himself 
not merely forms the best estimate he can of the outcome of his actions, but he is likely also to estimate 
the probability that his estimate is correct. The ‘degree’ of certainty or of confidence felt in the conclusion 
after it is reached cannot be ignored, for it is of the greatest practical significance. The action which 
follows upon an opinion depends as much upon the amount of confidence in that opinion as it does upon 
the favourableness of the opinion itself.” 
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choices of an hypothetical violator of the Savage axioms.17 As we shall see in the following section, 
all three of these technical aspects are the subject matter of a much deeper investigation and 
development in his doctoral thesis. 
 
 Even though he presents the concluding remarks of the 1961 article as tentative, Ellsberg 
forcefully argues that he does not consider Savage’s approach to be a normative guide in ambiguous 
contexts. He suggests that this must remain true for all deliberate violators of the theory. As a matter 
of fact, “once certain patterns of ‘violating’ behaviour [are] distinguished and described in terms of 
a specified decision rule” (Ellsberg 1961a, p. 669), like the one he suggests, economic theorists 
have to wonder what kind of normative status can be attributed to this decision rule. Contrary to 
what economics literature on decision-making inspired by his results has been assuming for over 
fifty years, Ellsberg was not silent on these issues and his doctoral thesis shows this. 
 
 
4. Assessing the Ellsberg Paradox 
 
The doctoral thesis submitted to the Economics Department of Harvard provides the philosophical 
background of Ellsberg’s critique of Savage as well as a thorough discussion of the literature on 
decision-making. As reported in a brief introductory note dated April 1962, the thesis draws heavily 
upon the 1961 article but “concentrates upon materials and aspects of the analysis considered 
subsequently to its acceptance for publication” (Ellsberg 2001, p. xl): the overlap between the 
article and the thesis is said to account for around ten per cent of the new material.18 This section 
offers an assessment of a selection of issues discussed in the thesis, with the aim of showing that 
Ellsberg’s ideas apply well beyond the paradox, both from a methodological and a technical 
viewpoint. More in particular, this section concentrates on the following issues: the probabilistic 
foundation of his theory, the validation of a normative theory, the notion of consistency in 
alternative probabilistic approaches, and a taxonomy of decision rules. 
 
 Before moving on, though, an important terminological aspect that distinguishes the thesis 
from the article is worth pointing out. In the thesis, the theorists who follow Ramsey, de Finetti and 
Savage in their subjective approach to probability, are no longer identified as Bayesians, as it was in 
the QJE article. They are now considered as part of a “neo-Bernoullian” school, namely, scholars 
who provided the axiomatic structure to justify the Bernoulli Proposition that a rational decision-
maker should maximise expected utility in making her decision (“moral expectation,” in the English 
translation of Daniel Bernoulli’s (1954) latin term “emolumentum medium”). This is to stress that 
there are also a number of authors who consider themselves to be Bayesians without subscribing to 
a sweeping application of Bernoulli’s principle of the maximisation of expected utility. The term 
“neo-Bernoullian” is used, then, to denote the “dominant wing … of the ‘neo-Bayesian’ school, 
which insists upon inferring probability from betting behaviour alone and demands that ‘reasonable’ 
behaviour be consistent in every case with definite, uniquely-defined numerical probabilities.” This 
wing must be distinguished from “less exacting ‘neo-Bayesians’ such as I. J. Good and myself” 
                                                 
17 Inspired by Ellsberg, Eichberger and Kelsey (1999) provided an axiomatization of this decision rule in the 
context of non-additive probability theory. 
18 Ellsberg referred to the thesis in his 1963 reply to Roberts, hinting at the fact that it presents a more 
elaborate justification of his critique of Savage on many issues. But the thesis remained unpublished and  
was almost completely ignored until its recent publication. The thesis is now reproduced in its original, 
unedited version, with an introduction by Isaac Levi and a bibliographical note edited by Mark Machina, 
in Ellsberg (2001). In his review of the recent printing of the thesis, Mukerji (2003, p. F188) observes that 
“it is simply breathtaking to note how many, many, years ahead of his time this man truly was.” 
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(Ellsberg 2001, p. 165 fn.).19 Moreover, in view of its rejection of the assumption that, in decision 
under uncertainty, there always exists a complete ordering of probability, Keynes’s epistemic 
approach to probability is put at the beginning of this tradition of though. 
 
4.1 Probabilistic foundations 
 
As in the 1961 article, Ellsberg opens his doctoral investigation with a reference to Knight. 
However, in the doctoral thesis the emphasis is more on Keynes and the authors who followed him 
in stressing vagueness and imprecision of subjective assessments, none of whom was quoted in the 
article. Ellsberg (2001, pp. 9, 11) attributes to Keynes’s Treatise on Probability the merit of having 
introduced “formally the notion of non-comparability of beliefs,” and recognises that the notion of 
weight of argument “seems closely related to our notion of ‘ambiguity’.” He also recalls that 
Keynes emphasised that, in situations where information is perceived to be vague, the traditional 
approach to probability is inadequate; and that Keynes’s discussion of “non-numerical” 
probabilities inspired Bernard O. Koopman (1940) and Irving J. Good (1952) in their investigations 
of an axiomatic structure compatible with an interval of probability priors. In particular, Ellsberg 
distinguishes Koopman’s and Good’s theories of “consistent judgments” from Ramsey’s, de 
Finetti’s and Savage’s theories of “consistent choices,” praising the fact that theories of intuitive 
probabilities constitute “a theoretical approach that admits vagueness as an explicit factor without 
apology and provides a formal vocabulary for discussing it” (p. 10). Another crucial reference is to 
Cedric A. Smith’s (1961) paper on consistency in statistical inferences, on which more later. 
 
 Furthermore, Ellsberg’s discussion of ambiguity as a consequence of “highly conflicting” 
information starts with Keynes. Ellsberg (2001, p. 11) notes that in order to exemplify the 
possibility of partially ordered probabilities, Keynes referred to conflicting evidence. In a vivid 
attempt to exemplify the effects of conflicting evidence Keynes argued that, before going out for a 
walk, it is an “arbitrary matter to decide for or against the umbrella … if the  barometer is high, but 
the clouds are black” (Keynes 1921, p. 32). Ellsberg associates this example with his own intuition 
about the situation of an “intelligence panel of experts advising the President on Soviet military 
inventory, each member giving a precise, definite probability distribution, each distribution 
different,” a situation that he himself, as a military analyst, experienced. 
 
Ostensibly, Ellsberg’s assessment of previous treatments of decision-making under 
uncertainty is not motivated by the necessity to provide an introductory overview of the state of the 
art. Rather, it is meant to show that before the new subjectivist mainstream consolidated, there had 
been a lively tradition of thought discussing decision-making from a probabilistic viewpoint. It also 
serves to demonstrate that this was a variegated lot, including economists like Keynes, Knight, and 
Shackle, mathematicians like Koopman and Wald, and statisticians like Good, Hodges, Lehmann 
and Smith. Ellsberg (2001, p. 12) argues that these authors share the same distrust about the 
significance of assuming that subjective beliefs can be always represented by a single and fully 
reliable additive probability function.20 
                                                 
19 Irving J. Good, was a British mathematical statistician known for his attempt to reject precise 
probabilities in an otherwise typically Bayesian framework (Good 1952 and 1962). The term “neo-
Bernoullian” was possibly borrowed by Good himself (Ellsberg 2011, p. 221), but the insistence on the 
Bernoulli Proposition as the pillar of mainstream decision theory is due to Allais (1953). 
20 George Shackle’s (1949) non-probabilistic theory of decision, cited by Arrow (1951) as the sole 
formalised alternative to probabilistic decision-making, is also a major reference in the thesis. Ellsberg 
(1961a, p. 643) had criticized Shackle’s “extreme form of the Knightian position” for his rejection of a 
representation of uncertainty via numerical probabilities in any situation of crucial importance to the 
decision-maker, including those clearly conditioned on an aleatory mechanism. But in the thesis he now 
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 The strength of the claim the doctoral thesis puts forward – namely, that a strict Bayesian 
approach such as the one endorsed by neo-Bernoullians is unable to distinguish between ambiguous 
and unambiguous decision contexts – suggests that Ellsberg’s aim was not limited to the testing of 
Savage’s theory. In his investigation Ellsberg shares with a number of scholars the cognitive unease 
of the theorist who accepts a theoretical approach in principle, but finds it restrictive in its 
application, and is inclined to question its normative value as a result.21 
 
4.2 The testing of a normative theory 
 
From the very beginning of his thesis Ellsberg professes his great admiration for Savage’s work. His 
praise does not hinge solely on Savage’s ability to devise a comprehensive axiomatic structure for a 
theory of decision-making. He values Savage’s perspective because, in following de Finetti’s 
operational definition of probability, Savage paved the way to the settling of the philosophical 
controversy about the notion of subjective probability. Savage’s contribution made it possible to 
abandon psychological introspection in decision-making under uncertainty, in analogy with 
Samuelson’s revealed-preference approach in the theory of choice. Moreover, Savage’s approach 
favoured the much awaited introduction of a collection of techniques for the measurement of 
definite subjective probabilities and utilities, like the one put forward by Davidson et al. (1957). 
 
 Therefore, Ellsberg’s respect for Savage is also motivated by methodological reasons. 
Ellsberg stresses that, in Savage’s perspective normative decision theory is not devoid of empirical 
content since it suggests the kind of observed behaviour that is compatible with the theoretical 
proposition. Specifically, the procedure of eliciting probabilities from choices makes it possible to 
rule out certain patterns of choice as not conforming to the theory. The test of the acceptability of a 
normative theory lies simply in telling an individual making decisions: “when certain maxims are 
presented for your consideration, you must ask  … how would you react if you noticed yourself 
violating them” (Savage 1954, p. 7, quoted in Ellsberg 2001, p. 24). As in the 1961 article, then, the 
test does not concern “unreflective behaviour,” but only situations in which the decision-maker is 
allowed to make, or change, her decision after thorough consideration. The empirical investigation 
that Savage’s approach makes possible, creates the possibility of questioning a theory when the 
decision-maker wishes to persist in her violation of the “maxims” of behaviour.22 So the 
identification of a clear-cut counterexample is instrumental to a discussion of the normative value of 
the theory. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
admits that “when ambiguity is extreme, by any of his indices: relevant information sparse, or obviously 
unreliable and contradictory; wide differences in the expressed expectations of different individuals; low 
confidence in available estimates,” Shackle’s “somber reflections” seem “too ominously relevant to the 
very circumstances upon which this study focuses to be dismissed” (Ellsberg 2001, pp. 16-17). On the 
links between Ellsberg’s ambiguity and Shackle’s uncertainty see Basili and Zappia (2010) and Zappia 
(2014). 
21 Regrettably, Ellsberg does not acknowledge that Keynes’s rejection of the criterion of maximising “moral 
expectations” in the Treatise on Probability preludes to an insightful analysis of the “making of practical 
decisions” (Basili and Zappia 2009). Also, apparently Ellsberg was not aware that Keynes had made a 
consistent used of the two-urn example to justify the influence of confidence in decision-making, on 
which see Feduzi (2010). 
22 Ellsberg notes that Savage suggested to him in conversation that the procedure he was following 
corresponded to that pursued by Bernoulli (1954) when suggesting his maxim of behaviour. When 
Bernoulli questioned the use of expected value in decision theory he made it through an empirical 
observation, known as the St. Petersburg Paradox. The rejection of the expected value was made on the 
grounds that no gambler would regret not to bet a high amount of money in St. Petersburg game, even 
when shown that the expected value of the game has an infinitely high value.  
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 Ellsberg’s point (2001, p. 27) is that, while it is true that the consistency of a certain set of 
axioms is a logical, normative problem, and not a psychological, descriptive one – as first argued by 
Marschak (1951) in his presentation of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s utility axioms –  the 
degree of acceptance and authority of certain maxims of behaviour must have a descriptive 
component nonetheless. A “system of logic” which satisfies logical consistency but does not apply 
to the deliberate decisions of a decision-maker may induce the decision-maker to consider, “more 
rational to satisfy his preferences and let the axioms satisfy themselves,” to use a sentence that 
Samuelson (1950) made famous when still an opponent of expected utility theory (Ellsberg 2001, p. 
29). Ellsberg forcefully argues that basic assumptions concerning logically consistent behaviour like 
the Savage axioms can be considered “eminently reasonable,” but not “uniquely reasonable,” as for 
instance Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961) suggested in their book systematizing the Bayesian viewpoint. 
The extension of “familiar rules of logic and arithmetic [to decision under uncertainty] is not a 
normative but a descriptive problem.” 
 
Ellsberg does not use the word falsifiability, but his main criterion for evaluating a 
normative theory is to ask whether its prescriptions can be carried out. The methodological 
argument he proposes follows a typically falsificationist approach. But his aim is not confined to 
reject Savage’s theory: he intends to provide heuristic advice about how to develop a new normative 
theory, arguably “less likely to be confronted with deliberate and persistent violation” when tested 
(Ellsberg 2001, p. 25). It is apparent that Ellsberg’s investigation does not stop after finding 
psychological element justifying the violations of the current theory. 23 
  
It is worth noting that in his thesis Ellsberg also insists on true empirical work. Since the 
theories he wants to criticize show the possibility of measuring subjective variables, important 
factors that justify the choices of deliberate violators that they do not account for should also be 
measurable. In order to achieve this, empirical research in the laboratory “should strongly 
complement and interact with the continuing analysis of normative principle” (Ellsberg 2001, p. 
34). Ellsberg approvingly quotes Becker and Brownson’s preliminary experimental study 
(published later as Becker and Brownson 1964), that was based on his 1961 article and aimed at the 
measurement in monetary units of the desire by experimental subjects to avoid drawing from 
ambiguous urns. Ellsberg’s (2001, p. 35) brief, but unequivocal assessment of empirical analysis 
concludes by foreboding the importance that laboratory experiments would assume in the following 
years: “empirical findings, as, hopefully, they begin to appear in more abundance, will undoubtedly 
change the views of every party to the current discussion in important ways now unforeseeable.” 
 
4.3 Consistency in decision-making 
 
Ellsberg recalls that de Finetti (1937) solved the problem of how to obtain numerical probabilities 
that represent degrees of belief in a certain event through an analysis of the conditions under which 
a decision-maker would be prepared to bet on the event. De Finetti’s contribution was to identify a 
system of betting prices apt to elicit “definite probabilities” from choices, and then to show that the 
requirement that these probabilities are “coherent” implies that they satisfy the axioms of 
probability.24 Although he objects to the fact that this can be done with respect to “every 
                                                 
23 Methodologically, there is a distinction to make between falsification and rejection. A counterexample 
may provide a necessary condition for the falsification of a normative theory. But this is not sufficient to 
reject a theory: a conjecture about the origins of the anomaly and a sketch of a new theory capable to give 
account of the anomaly is needed as well (Lakatos 1970, Guala 2000). Ellsberg’s thesis aims to provide 
heuristic advice about how to develop a new normative theory. 
24 In his Foundations Savage (1954, pp. 27-29) was not as explicit as de Finetti on the analogy with betting 
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conceivable event,” Ellsberg (2001, p. 55) claims that, in principle, he accepts de Finetti’s approach 
and the Bayesian methodology of eliciting probabilities from choices. Ellsberg’s acceptance, 
though, is coupled with a rejection of de Finetti’s “condition of coherence.” 
 
 Ellsberg argues that there is no rationale for the assumption that the decision-maker is 
always willing to take each side of a bet. For purposes of measurement, de Finetti regarded 
probabilities as “prices” and assumed that the highest price an individual is ready to pay for betting 
in favour of an event coincides with the lowest she is ready to accept for taking the other side of the 
bet. No inequality between upper and lower betting prices is contemplated by de Finetti. But “the 
explicit assumption ruling this inequality out as a possibility for reasonable behaviour,” Ellsberg 
(2001, p. 68) contends,  “seems fairly gratuitous; at least, I cannot see that it has any direct intuitive 
appeal although it would follow as a theorem from the Savage postulates.” 
 
 Ellsberg is endorsing here the approach of deriving lower and upper betting probabilities 
presented by Cedric Smith at the Annual Meeting of the Royal Statistical Society in October 1960 
(Smith 1961), an approach that distinguishes the possibility to elicit “definite” probabilities from 
the fact that these probabilities must show the kind of consistency de Finetti assumed. Ellsberg 
notices that probabilities that can be derived from the choices of a deliberate violator of Savage 
axioms in his urn example are “indefinite” between limits, but cannot be termed “irrational” by 
means of the consistency argument. Indeed, consistency does not apply only to a set of “precise, 
definite beliefs,” since “beliefs that must be treated as ‘indefinite’ within limits can still be precise 
enough to determine decisions in betting, and susceptible of quantitative expression in terms of 
inequalities” without the decision-maker falling prey to a Dutch book (Ellsberg 2001, p. 88). 
Arguments based on de Finetti’s notion of consistency “contain, implicitly, the special, additional, 
assumption” that the decision-maker who is willing to pay a price p to bet on an event is also 
willing to pay q = 1–p to bet on its complement. But Smith demonstrated that if the requirement of 
consistency of the betting prices is to avoid that a book is made against the decision-maker when q 
≠ 1–p, this implies simply that p + q ≤ 1. In order for a book to be avoided, p+q = 1 is only a special 
case. Ellsberg (2001, p. 85)  approvingly quotes Cox and Good, who, in their discussion on Smith’s 
paper, remark that the “reluctance to gamble” that is allowed by Smith when he identifies a non-
betting interval “seems intuitively to correspond to recognizable behaviour-patterns associated with 
circumstances in which opinions are exceptionally indefinite.”25 
 
 To sum up. An argument based on coherence has great strength since introduces an 
“objective” criterion of “reasonable” behaviour, by excluding that it is possible “to make a fool” of 
the decision-maker. But, Ellsberg (2001, p. 88) concludes, it is possible 
 
“to announce a set of betting quotations that is comfortably ‘coherent’, precluding any 
danger of falling prey to a Dutch book, yet which is not consistent with the existence of a 
definite probability measure over all events.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
behaviour, but later he endorsed this procedure for explanatory purposes (Savage 1962).  
25 It is worth noting that de Finetti and Savage were very much impressed by Smith’s argument. In de Finetti 
and Savage 1962 (a joint paper written in Italian, never translated into English) they discussed at length 
Smith’s perspective, somewhat approvingly, and object to it only on the grounds that in order to provide a 
“zone of indecision” Smith’s theory defines an interval of probabilities with sharp edges that are at least 
as questionable as the sharpness of the point probabilities it criticises. A similar point is made by Savage 
(1962) and quoted by Ellsberg (2001, p. 73). Ellsberg objects to this view on the grounds that his 
examples imply a “zone of indefiniteness” that is distinguishable from any “zone of indecision,” since he 
does not consider that vagueness as necessarily implying indecision. 
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4.4 Decision rules for a generalized Bayesian approach 
 
As we have seen, Ellsberg’s aim in the thesis is to provide an alternative theory for Savage’s 
“Bernoullian,” strictly-Bayesian approach. His alternative theory is thought to be compatible with a 
generalised Bayesian viewpoint and endowed with a clear normative content. The 1961 paper is 
suggestive of such a theory when rejects the maximization of expected utility in ambiguous 
contexts, and introduces a criterion for choice depending on the degree of confidence in the 
probability assessment. In the thesis, Ellsberg tries to accomplish the more relevant task of 
justifying the proposed decision rule on the basis of a theoretical approach that is as general as to 
conceive an analysis of situation in which the decision-maker “does not know” the probability 
distribution of the pay-off relevant events, without conflating uncertainty into risk. 
 
 This aim is accomplished in two steps. First, Ellsberg provides a Bayesian justification for 
the choices of  the unrepentant violator of Savage postulates to be included in the rational realm. 
Second, he derives a decision rule. In the probabilistic framework he wants to introduce, we find, on 
the one hand, the Bernoullian, strictly-Bayesian decision-maker, who may keep in mind a whole set 
of “reasonably acceptable” probability distributions before acting, but eventually settles upon a 
single distribution (or acts as if she did). The (generalized) Bayesian decision-maker, on the other 
hand, retains all those probability distributions that do not definitely contradict her “vague” opinion, 
especially when relevant information is perceived as scanty, unreliable, contradictory, ambiguous. 
As seen above, Ellsberg claims that the formal structure that guarantees the consistency of such 
probabilistic beliefs is provided by Koopman, Good and Smith.26 
 
 The second step is a thorough analysis of what decision rule best suits this generalised 
probabilistic viewpoint. As mentioned earlier, Ellsberg concluded his 1961 article with an analysis 
of how to act “reasonably” when more than one personal probability distribution is acceptable and 
proposed the use of an index including the degree of confidence in a probability assessment. The 
1962 thesis features a comparison between alternative criteria for explaining the observed 
departures from Savage’s axioms, including decision rules not discussed in the article. Ellsberg 
observes that a number of alternatives to Savage’s maximisation of subjective expected utility have 
been devised to deal with complete ignorance and that an extensive examination of the axiomatic 
structure underlying these decision rules is available (Milnor 1954, Chernoff 1954, Luce and Raiffa 
1957). Among other decision rules, Ellsberg concentrate on what he calls Hurwicz α-maximin and 
proposes to follow Hurwicz’s suggestion (1951b) to apply it to a context of partial ignorance. 
 
 Hurwicz’s decision rule – referred to as Hurwicz α-criterion by Luce and Raiffa (1957) and 
better known as the Arrow-Hurwicz criterion after Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) – considers the 
behaviour  associated with Wald’s maximin as overly pessimistic and introduces a parameter 
representing the degree of optimism of a decision-maker who is completely ignorant of the relevant 
probabilities. If α – a coefficient ranging from 0 to 1 – represents optimism, the Hurwicz’s index is: 
[αmax(x)+(1-α)min(x)]. Both the worst and the best possible outcomes associated with action x are 
considered. In his attempt to find a decision rule that can account for the behaviour of unrepentant 
violators of Savage’s axioms, Ellsberg (2001, pp. 182-183) examines Hurwicz α-maximin in detail, 
and discusses which values of α make the behaviour of a decision-maker compatible with his 
paradox. So the idea of a set of distributions over the states of the world is maintained, but now it is 
the Hurwicz criterion that is applied to the restricted set of plausible distributions. 
 
                                                 
26 This is in the main the road taken by authors unpersuaded by the strict Bayesian perspective codified by 
Savage. Among these see Levi (1974), Gardenförs and Sahlin (1982), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and 
Walley (1991). See also Levi (2001). 
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It is worth noting that Ellsberg (2001, p. 184) points out that Hurwicz (1951a) and Arrow 
(1953) had indicated a number of axioms on the basis of which “any criterion satisfying a certain 
subset of these requirements takes into account only the minimum and maximum utility associated 
with each act.”27  So, the use of the best/worst pairs is justified by Ellsberg because of its normative 
appropriateness. This accords well with the emphasis the thesis lays on the search for a new 
normative rational underlying decision-making under uncertainty. 
 
 Ellsberg (2001, p. 195) concludes his investigation with a taxonomy of criteria in terms of 
confidence and optimism. A synthesis between the 1961 and the 1962 suggestions is also offered as 
a proposal for a new normative decision rule. A criterion combining Bayesian and minimax 
principles, that can generate all the choice patterns observed in urn experiments, called “restricted 
Bayes-Hurwicz criterion,” is proposed as eminently general. In order to account for both confidence 
and optimism, the normative proposal is to prescribe that the decision-maker chose the action x that 
maximises the index ρE(x)+(1-ρ)[αmax(x)+(1-α)min(x)]. But the new normative theory, does not 
suggest how to fix the value of ρ and α in given circumstances for a given decision-maker, in much 
the same way the neo-Bernoullians would not dictate the shape of the utility function. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
In a recent paper on the way mainstream decision theory understands rationality when dealing with 
uncertainty, Gilboa et al. (2008, pp. 286-87) argue: “The Bayesian approach could …. be viewed as 
an elegant but imperfect method for representation of uncertainty, one among many to be used 
depending on the application. Indeed, this is the way that it is viewed by many in diverse fields such 
as statistics, philosophy and computer science. However, within economic theory the Bayesian 
approach is the sole claimant to the throne of rationality.” 
  
 Daniel Ellsberg offered the counterexample to Bayesian decision-making that got the 
normative value of the theory into trouble. But he could not to contribute to the foundations of a 
new normative theory. An assessment of his contribution in the more encompassing framework of 
his doctoral thesis suggests that, following in a tradition of thinkers that were critical of the 
maximisation of Bernoulli’s “moral expectation” and supported a generalised version of the 
Bayesian approach, Ellsberg provided a thorough philosophical, methodological and theoretical 
background for his critique. 
 
 This paper has simply tried to argue that, contrary to the conventional wisdom emerging 
from the current literature in decision-making, Ellsberg in not simply a paradox. Had Daniel 
Ellsberg’s general analysis been available when economists discussed probability and decision 
theory, it might well have renewed interest in theories of decision under uncertainty much earlier 
than it has been the case. 
 
                                                 
27 Ellsberg (2001, p. 206) explains his interest in Hurwicz’s proposal also by arguing that “a normative 
criterion acceptable for my own decision-making [in highly uncertain contexts] would certainly take 
account of favourable possibilities in addition to ‘worst’ possibilities.” It is inevitable to note that certain 
recent developments in decision theory elaborate on the intuition behind the Hurwicz criterion exactly in 
the direction suggested by Ellsberg. See the class of so-called αMEU criteria, where the optimism 
parameter is introduced in the multiple priors context (Girardato et al. 2004, Chateauneuf et al. 2007). 
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